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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
POTENTIAL FOR COERCION IN CONSENT
SOLICITATIONS FOR BONDS
ROYCE DE R. BARONDES*
INTRODUCrION

W

HEN corporations issue bonds' to the public, to induce investors to purchase the bonds at a higher price, the corporations
frequently agree that they will not engage in specified transactions.
These agreements, known as covenants, may subsequently prevent
consummation of transactions that an issuing corporation's management believes to be in the best interest of the corporation.2 In those

* Member of the Bars of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New York. Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 1985-1992; J.D., University of Virginia, 1985; S.B.
and S.M. (Mechanical Engineering), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982.
Tom Brome of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, in an offhand remark made a number of
years ago, first drew my attention to the risk that companies may compel their bondholders to approve amendments to indentures through the consent mechanism discussed in this Article. Because I have been puzzled and distracted by the manner in
which this issue had been contractually resolved during the time that I practiced securities law, I remain uncertain whether this acknowledgement also should express
gratitude. I also would like to thank H. Kurt von Moltke of Kirkland & Ellis for his
thoughtful comments on the issues considered in this Article, including the identification of a number of patterns in the actions of participants that are observed in
practice.
1. This Article uses the term "bond" to refer generically to debt securities.
Others may use the terms "notes" and "debentures" to distinguish the maturity of the
securities or the existence of any security.
2. There are four major categories of restrictive covenants that are contained in
indentures: (i) covenants restricting the assumption of additional indebtedness; (ii)
covenants limiting the payment of dividends; (iii) covenants restricting acquisitions,
mergers and other changes in control; and (iv) covenants regulating the firm's disposition of assets. Handbook of Corporate Finance § 12, at 27 (Edward I. Altman & Mary
J. McKinney eds., 1986); Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. Fm. Econ. 117, 118-19 (1979). See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time
of Restructuring,1989 Duke LJ.92, 139-42, 156-58 (discussing the historical development of the scope of covenants); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate
Governance,41 Bus. Law. 413,424-29 (1986) (discussing the extent of covenants typically contained in indentures). Any of these types of covenants might prevent consummation of a desirable transaction and therefore become the object of a consent
solicitation or an exchange offer. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of ConstrainedChoice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1207, 1216 n.27 (1991) ("Generally, the
amendments would eliminate restrictive covenants; in a few cases, they would also
subordinate the untendered old securities to the new securities or, in the case of secured debt, would release collateral pledged to support the old securities."); Marcel
Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant
Changes?, 66 J. Bus. 499, 504 (1993) (reporting in a survey of 48 events that involved
consent solicitations, or tender offers or exchange offers coupled with consent solicitations, the need to receive the consent of the bondholders arose from the following
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circumstances, one solution is for the corporation to prepay the bonds.

This approach may not be feasible, however, because some bonds are
not subject to prepayment at the option of the issuer.' Even if the
bonds are callable, the specified prepayment premium may be prohibitively large in the particular context.4 Where bonds whose covenants
prohibit a transaction cannot be called feasibly, management may instead seek to obtain the express consent of the bondholders to the

transaction by amending the indenture under which the bonds were
issued. The process by which issuers obtain the agreement of bondholders is called a consent solicitation. Typically, these consent solicitations are directed to holders of non-investment grade bonds. 5
The Trust Indenture Act of 19396 (the "TIA") requires that publicly

issued debt registered under the Securities Act of 1933' be issued pursuant to an indenture qualified under the TIA.8 TWo instruments create rights of the holders of publicly offered bonds against the issuer,
the indenture and the bond itself.9 Although an amendment to the

indenture would modify each bondholder's rights under the indenture,
types of transactions: leveraged acquisitions, 37.5%; payments to stockholders,
16.7%; internal restructurings with no financial distress, 12.5%; asset sales without the
assumption of debt by the purchaser, 10.4%; the issuance of additional debt, 8.3%;
the avoidance of mandatory repurchases, 4.2%; and other, 10.4%).
Indentures for subordinated bonds typically provide that the terms of the subordination provisions cannot be amended without the approval of all holders affected
thereby. Ford Lacy & David M. Dolan, Legal Aspects of Public Debt Restructurings:
Exchange Offers, Consent Solicitations and Tender Offers, 4 DePaul Bus. L.J. 49, 67
(1991); see, e.g., Model Simplified Indenture § 9.02(7), reprinted in 38 Bus. Law. 741,
763 (1983). Therefore, issuers typically cannot further subordinate outstanding
subordinated bonds as a part of a consent solicitation. However, issuers desiring to
achieve a similar effect can issue debt in an exchange offer having a term less than the
remaining term of the outstanding bonds or can cause subsidiaries to incur debt issued
in exchange for outstanding bonds. See McDaniel, supra, at 426 ("Unsecured subsidiary debt is much like secured parent company debt because bondholders of the parent
can reach the assets of the subsidiary only after the creditors of the subsidiary have
been paid off."); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibitionin Bond Workouts, 97 Yale L.J.
232, 246 (1987) (discussing the issuance of debt having a shorter term); Note, DistressContingent Convertible Bonds: A ProposedSolution to the Excess Debt Problem, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 1857, 1863 n.36 (1991) (discussing the issuance of debt having a shorter
term).
3. One survey indicates that 88% of the bonds sold during the first quarter of
1991 were not callable. Gene Laber, Bond Covenantsand Forgone Opportunities: The
Case of Burlington Northern Railroad Company, Fin. Mgmt., Summer 1992, at 71, 72
n.1.
4. Generally, the price to call bonds equals principal plus accrued interest and a
premium. The premium typically declines over time, beginning at a fee between one
year's interest and one-half that amount, and decreasing to zero. The Handbook of
Fixed Income Securities 269 (Frank J. Fabozzi et al. eds., 3d ed. 1991). Other bonds
may provide for no prepayment premium.
5. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ddd(b), 77eee(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
9. See generally Roe, supra note 2, at 256-58 (summarizing the development of a
doctrine under which holders could have separate actions under the two documents).
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a bondholder's right to receive payment of principal or interest on the
bond when due generally may not be impaired without that bondholder's consent.'" This prohibition effectively prevents issuers from
making amendments to those fundamental obligations as a part of
consent solicitations. However, the TIA does not require that other
amendments receive the approval of all affected bondholders; the vote
required to approve such other amendments is determined as a matter
of contract.
Companies desiring to amend an indenture frequently attempt to
increase the likelihood that a consent solicitation will be successful by
offering to pay a specified amount to each bondholder who delivers a
consent approving the amendment. Those amendments also commonly are sought in connection with a simultaneous exchange offer or
tender offer, in which the issuer offers to exchange its outstanding
bonds for other securities or property. In such a case, a bondholder is
required to deliver a consent as a condition to tendering bonds in the
exchange offer or tender offer (sometimes referred to as an "exit consent"), and the issuer may condition payment for the consent on acceptance of the exchange offer or tender offer by a specified
percentage of the bondholders. In this fashion, issuers attempt to encourage acceptance of the consent solicitation (and any simultaneous
exchange offer or tender offer), as those who do not consent or tender
will have reduced benefits under the indenture after consummation of
the consent solicitation. Issuers desiring to maximize the bondholders' incentive to consent may provide that the bonds not tendered will
be divested of more contractual benefits than are necessary to consummate the contemplated transaction. This type of offer increases

10. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The application of this requirement to securities having sophisticated terms may raise difficult issues. Compare
UPIC & Co. v. Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 448,450,456 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that an issuer's contractual obligation to repurchase bonds upon the
election of any holder, within 30 days of a specified interest reset date, is a payment of
principal governed by 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b)) with McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse
Entertainment, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,389, at 98,648-50
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1994) (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) did not pertain to a
holder's right to have bonds repurchased, at the holder's option, upon certain "triggering events," which included consummation of a merger not approved by the "Independent Directors"). The TIA permits an indenture to grant holders of not less
than 75% of the bonds the right to agree to the postponement of any interest payment
for up to three years. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. This optional provision is not common. For example, it is not included in the Model Simplified Indenture. Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, § 6.07. Under the TIA, an indenture
also may limit the right of bondholders to bring an action that would impair the lien
of the indenture on any property. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Section 318(c) of the TIA provides that terms required by the TIA to be included in
indentures qualified under the TIA are incorporated by reference into those indentures and control in the case of any conflict with the express terms of the indenture. 15
U.S.C. § 77rrr(c) (Supp. IV 1992).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

the incentive to tender by increasing the detriment arising from not
agreeing to a successful consent solicitation.
Bondholders presented with this type of incentive may find it not to
be benign. Payment of a consent fee is a clear example of vote buying, and bondholders have challenged the legality of consent solicitations on the basis that the payment of a fee for a vote violates public
policy. However, these challenges have not been successful.11
Because issuers control the structure of the consent solicitation,
they have the ability to apply significant pressure on bondholders.
This relationship appears to present the possibility that issuers will be
able to compel bondholders to consent to amendments in transactions
in which the consent fee does not entirely compensate for the decrease in value flowing from the amendment. Because the consent fee
is paid only to those bondholders who deliver a consent, one might
plausibly argue that bondholders will consent to a bad deal. Bondholders might rationally decide that agreeing to a disadvantageous
amendment and receiving a consent fee is preferable to assuming the
risk of receiving no fee and nevertheless having the amendment approved. Commentators analyzing these legal relationships have concluded that consent solicitations are similar to two-step, front end
loaded stock acquisitions and have stated that bondholders may be
placed in a Prisoner's Dilemma. 2 If these analyses were correct,
bondholders would be unable to negotiate collectively with issuers
(absent a binding contract under which bondholders were required to
act collectively), and bondholders would be compelled to consent to
transactions not in their best interest. However, recent empirical evidence indicates that bondholders frequently are able to negotiate with
issuers and obtain better terms.' 3

This Article examines why issuers frequently cannot present bondholders with an offer that draws on collective action problems to force
the acceptance of the offer by the bondholders. The analysis is restricted to publicly offered bonds. For a number of reasons, privately
placed debt presents fewer opportunities for coercion. A prior business relationship among various purchasers, which facilitates cooperation, may be more likely with respect to privately placed debt.
Privately placed debt often has more significant protection for the
bondholders than public debt with the same level of seniority. 14 The
11. See infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.

12. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
13.
14.
Times
Co. v.

See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad
and Good, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1821, 1825-26 (1992); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins.
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting a plain-

tiff's internal memorandum that noted that private debt contains stronger covenant

protection); William A. Klein et al., The Call Provision of CorporateBonds: A Stan-

dard Form in Need of Change, 18 J. Corp. L. 653, 666 n.57 (1993) (stating that 85% of
a sample of private redeemable debt contained yield maintenance provisions, which
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greater protection afforded holders of privately placed debt no doubt
arises, at least in part, because counsel for the purchasers often negotiates the terms of the debt directly with the issuer. These negotiations
are in contrast to the negotiation of the covenants of publicly issued
debt, which are between the issuer and the underwriters."5 These fac-

tors may combine to diminish collective action problems for holders
of privately placed debt. For similar reasons, holders of syndicated

16
commercial loans are less likely to face collective action problems.

Because other commentators have argued that consent solicitations

are coercive, this Article contemplates consent solicitations in which
an issuer is proposing an amendment to the governing indenture that
will have a material adverse effect on the outstanding bonds, and, as a
result, an adversarial relationship develops between the issuer and the

bondholders. In some circumstances, the relationship may not be adversarial. For example, if the amendment will have a minuscule effect
on the value of the bonds, bondholders might properly decide that the
cost of performing an extended analysis of the issue outweighs the
cost of consenting to a reasonable offer.' 7 Alternatively, cooperative
relationships might arise where an issuer proposes to increase the aggregate value of its outstanding bonds in connection with an extraordinary transaction that also would benefit the corporation as a
are uncommon in redeemable public debt); Martin Riger, The Trust Indenture as Bargained Contract The Persistence of Myth, 16 J. Corp. L. 211, 233-35 (1991) (citing
MetropolitanLife); Smith & Warner, supra note 2, at 150-51 (1979) (citing evidence
consistent with this proposition). See generally Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have
More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 46-51 (discussing a perceived absence of significant restrictive
covenants).
15. See generally Brudney, supra note 14, at 1830 (discussing the process by which
these covenants are negotiated). That is not to imply that issuers impose the terms of
the covenants of publicly offered bonds on the underwriters (and their counsel). See
id.; Tauke, supra note 14, at 23 ("To protect [their] reputational interests, bond underwriters will endeavor to negotiate terms that provide adequate protection of bondholders' interests."). But see Riger, supra note 14, at 219 ("Essentially, the indenture
is only a depository of terms fixed by the issuer."). In fact, the indenture is customarily drafted by counsel to the underwriter(s), id at 223 n.75, with the comments of the

issuer incorporated if all participants agree. Moreover, the underwriter(s) may incor-

porate concerns of the prospective purchasers received during the marketing period,
before the indenture is finalized. As a practical matter, many of those comments may
represent accumulated wisdom, as prospective purchasers in prior offerings of other
issuers may have declined to purchase bonds citing the inadequacy of the covenants.
However, underwriters clearly are subject to conflicting incentives. Because they are
hired by the issuer, and may hope to be hired by the issuer in future offerings, underwriters have an interest, not shared with the purchasers of the bonds, in agreeing to
covenants that are favorable to the issuer. Id at 216. These conflicting interests play a
role in causing public bonds not to benefit from covenants that are as strict as those
contained in privately placed debt. Other distinctions, such as the number or relative
sophistication of the purchasers, also may be important factors.
16. See Roe, supra note 2, at 274 n.130.
17. If the amendment does not adversely affect the bondholders as bondholders,
the bondholders' consent to the amendment generally is not required under the indenture. E.g., Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, § 9.01(4).
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whole. In other cases, disinterested observers might conclude that
bondholders are holding out when presented with consent solicitations that offer a positive return, in an attempt to appropriate gains
from the stockholders.' 8 This Article does not consider those types of
transactions.
Part I of this Article discusses the legal principles applicable to consent solicitations in which a fee is paid in exchange for delivery of a
consent. Part I first summarizes the cases that have addressed the legality of consent solicitations. Those cases, which held that these consent solicitations are lawful, were decided solely on the basis of state
law. However, certain provisions of federal securities law are potentially applicable to consent solicitations. Part I then considers the potential effect of two federal securities acts, the TIA and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,19 on consent solicitations. Part I concludes
that bondholders have a powerful argument that the TIA, coupled
with contractual terms frequently included in indentures, prohibit issuers' counting votes obtained through customary consent
solicitations.
Part II of this Article evaluates the economic structure of the consent solicitation process. That part first reviews the known analysis of
the consent solicitation process as a single-game Prisoner's Dilemma.
This analysis first considers a class of bonds held by two bondholders.
The examination is then expanded to incorporate a single consent solicitation with multiple bondholders. Both single consent solicitations
in which there is a fixed fee per bond and consent solicitations in
which there is a fixed aggregate fee, to be allocated among all consenting bondholders, are reviewed.
Part II of this Article then identifies reasons why consent solicitations should be modeled as repeated games, i.e., games in which each
bondholder has a non-zero probability of facing a similar consent solicitation in the future (with respect to the same or another issuer).
Part II then demonstrates that under plausible assumptions concerning the strategies that the bondholders will consider and the likelihood
that each bondholder will face a second consent solicitation in the future, an issuer will be unable to create a Prisoner's Dilemma, and
compel bondholders to consent to an amendment, unless the bondholders are made almost whole. That is, under these assumptions, issuers will be unable to assure that bondholders will consent unless the
fee paid for a consent almost entirely compensates for the decrease in
the value of the bonds arising from the amendment (and any other
simultaneous transactions). These assumptions are sufficient to determine that frequently bondholders will not be in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
That result implies that issuers will be unable to assure that bondhold18. See infra note 92.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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ers will consent to inadequate offers. However, that result leaves uncertain how bondholders will respond to any particular consent
solicitation.
Part III of this Article then expands on the models described in part
II by making assumptions concerning the likelihood that other bondholders will consent. These additional assumptions permit the examination of a proposed regulatory revision. Under this proposal, after
termination of each consent solicitation, each significant institutional
investor would be required to disclose whether it delivered a consent.
The analysis in part III concludes that such a requirement could provide significant additional protection to bondholders from "coercive"
consent solicitations.
I.

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

A. Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and Katz v.Oak IndustriesInc.
A leading case construing the extent to which issuers may properly
offer their bondholders consideration in exchange for a consent to an
amendment to the governing indenture is Kass v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc."° In Kass, holders of convertible debentures were offered either
$35 in cash or $125 in merchandise for each $1000 in face amount of
each of five classes of bonds for which a consent to an amendment to
the respective indenture was given. 1 The issuer intended to pay a
dividend as part of a reorganization. Because covenants in the indentures prohibited the payment of the dividend, the issuer solicited consents for an amendment, considered at a bondholder meeting, that
would have permitted the distribution. 22 The plaintiffs alleged that
because the payment was to be made only to those bondholders who
voted in favor of the amendment, the offer was improper either as
vote buying or as a breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing.23
As to the first of the plaintiffs' theories, the court, construing Schreiber v. Carney, 4 stated, "The purposes and object that would support a
conclusion that an agreement is void or against public policy are ...
summarized [in Schreiber] as fraud or an attempt to disenfranchise
other shareholders."' The court stated that there could be no claim
20. 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 1074 (Del. Ch.), appeal refused, 518 A.2d 983 (Del. 1986).

21. Id. at 1076-77.
22. Id. at 1076.

23. Id. at 1078.
24. 447 A.2d 17 (Del.Ch. 1982).
25. 12 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1080. The ability to buy stockholders' votes has been
addressed by a number of commentators. E.g., Thomas J. Andrd, Jr., A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Control,63 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 535 (1990); Robert C. Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 776 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395, 410-11 (1983); Michael D. Schmitz, Comment, Shareholder Vote Buying-A Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality, 1968 Wis. L Rev. 927.
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of fraud,2 6 as the terms of the offer were fully disclosed. The court
analyzed the possibility of disenfranchisement as follows:
The fact that the offer in this case is one made publicly to all voters
on the same terms-that each bondholder is free to accept or reject
it-precludes, in my opinion, a conclusion that it disenfranchises
any voter or group of voters (although the same could not perhaps
be said were the offer of consideration in exchange for a bondholder's vote not made to all bondholders on the same terms).2
The court similarly disposed of the plaintiffs' second argument. Relying on Katz v. Oak IndustriesInc.,28 the court construed the scope of
the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing as turning on
whether the parties "would have agreed to proscribe the act later
complained of... had they thought to negotiate with respect to that
matter."2 9 Applying this test, the court stated:
Each holder is offered the opportunity to accept or reject the consideration offered. Each will continue to own bonds and thus each
has an economic incentive of the same kind to evaluate the question
whether any threat to the value of his or her bonds posed by the
amendment is more or less valuable than the consideration offered
for his or her consent. I recognize the ways in which the structure of
the consent payment complicates that choice and increases the risk
of withholding consent. But, even if one chooses to characterize
that deliberate increase in risk as "coercive" (a murky concept of
limited analytical utility), I cannot conclude that it is wrongfully so
on this record.30

In considering both arguments, the court emphasized that the offer
was made to all bondholders. This reasoning implies that offers that
are not made to all holders, and possibly offers that are made to all
26. 12 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1080.
27. Id.
28. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
29. 12 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1081 (quoting Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880
(Del. Ch. 1986)). See generally Brudney, supra note 14, at 1845-49 (discussing the
possible application of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing); Kenneth Lehn &
Annette Poulsen, Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in
Leveraged Buyouts, 34 J.L. & Econ. 645, 657 (1991) (stating that the covenants do not
create separate substantive rights); Riger, supra note 14, at 225 (analyzing the implied
covenant of good faith and stating, "Delaware courts find the implied covenant of
good faith breached only if the language of the indenture indicates that, had the parties who negotiated the indenture thought of the act complained of as a breach of the
implied covenant, they would have agreed to proscribe it."); Tauke, supra note 14, at
123-33 (discussing the effect of the implied covenant of good faith on the rights of
bondholders); Andrew L. Bab, Note, Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem
of Coercion, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 862-63 (1991) (describing alternative theories
concerning the contours of the implied covenant of good faith). Some issuers now
expressly disclose in the prospectus covering the bonds that any consents obtained in
connection with exchange offers or tender offers will be included. E.g., Proffitt's, Inc.,
Prospectus, 43/% Convertible Subordinated Debentures Due 2003, Registration No.
33-70000, at 30 (Oct. 19, 1993).
30. 12 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1082 (emphasis added).

1994]

CONSENT SOLICITATIONS

bondholders through a mechanism that disadvantages certain bondholders,3 may violate either public policy or the implied covenants of
good faith and fair dealing.32
In a consent solicitation coupled with an exchange offer or a tender
offer, i.e., an exit consent, consenting bondholders do not "continue to
own [the] bonds." Continuity of ownership was an integral part of the
analysis in Kass.33 Kass therefore suggests that exit consents might
violate the covenants of good faith and fair dealing. However, that
factual pattern had arisen in Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.3 Katz concerned a consent solicitation/exchange offer in which bondholders
were offered the right to exchange bonds for payment certificates that
were to be payable shortly after the closing of a contemplated extraordinary transaction. 3 To tender, a bondholder had to consent to
amendments to the corresponding indenture, which were adverse to
the bondholders. 6 The court held that the transaction did not violate
the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.3 7 The language
in Kass that appears to condition the ability of an issuer to make such
an offer on the consenting bondholders remaining subject to the
amended terms of the indenture therefore offers little protection for
bondholders under indentures that have no express provision prohibiting the payment of a fee for delivering a consent.
In Katz, however, the plaintiffs also relied on express language in
the indenture to argue that the consent solicitation was not permitted.
The indenture had a "sterilization provision," under which the issuer
could not vote securities that it held in its treasury. 38 The court stated:
That the consent is to be given concurrently with the transfer of the
bond to the issuer does not in any sense create the kind of conflict
of interest that the indenture's prohibition on voting treasury securities contemplates. Not only will the proposed consents be granted
31. A partial offer without proration, in which the issuer accepted consents in the
order in which they were delivered, might be construed as excluding bondholders who

were not institutional investors.
32. Cf Lacy & Dolan, supra note 2, at 70 n.114 (stating that offers made to fewer
than all bondholders may be suspect). The increasing frequency of consent solicitations may make it more difficult for plaintiffs to meet the test that the parties would
have proscribed the arrangement had they thought to negotiate with respect to the

matter. This prominence suggests that those drafting indentures consciously exclude
such a provision. See also supra note 29.
33. See supra text accompanying note 30.
34. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).

35. IL at 876.
36. Id. at 877.
37. Id. at 881. But see Bab, supra note 29, at 868 ("The issuer is thus seeking to

take away a bargained-for contractual protection from any remaining bondholders
that no reasonable bondholder could expect would be eliminated. By doing so, the
issuer is breaching its implied duty of good faith.").
38. Katz, 508 A.2d at 881. It is not clear why the court in Kass did not discuss any
sterilization provisions, which are discussed infra at notes 46-63 and accompanying
text.
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or withheld only by those with a financial interest to maximize the
return on their investment in [the issuer's] bonds, but the incentive
to consent is39equally available to all members of each class of
bondholders.

These cases have been analyzed by a number of commentators.
Some commentators have considered alternative bases for voiding
votes of bonds for which the issuer has paid a fee, or noted theories in
other contexts that might be so applied, including the following: that
a sterilization provision should be interpreted in a manner that does
not prevent its circumvention and that permitting such consent payments will result in such a circumvention;40 that bondholders may
have a right to rely on other bondholders voting in accordance with
the best interests of the bondholders as bondholders; 41 that such payments might violate a proposed fiduciary duty owed by the issuer to
the bondholders; 42 that indentures should be construed in accordance
with the reasonable expectations of the parties,43 in which case issuers
39. Katz, 508 A.2d at 881.
40. Bab, supra note 29, at 869.
41. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1262-63; Bab, supra note 29, at 873 ("There is
no case law that decides whether bondholders should be held to a duty analogous to
that of shareholders to vote in accordance with their best interests as stockholders.
Most cases, however, indicate that courts are hostile to any suggestion that would
extend duties to bondholders beyond their contracts.").
42. Bratton, supra note 2, at 118-19 (discussing decisions addressing whether there
is a fiduciary duty owed to bondholders); Brudney, supra note 14, at 1836-45 (noting
that there is no support in case law for the existence of a fiduciary duty from an issuer
to holders of non-convertible bonds); McDaniel, supra note 2, at 443 (identifying the
possibility that issuers may owe a fiduciary duty to their bondholders); Riger, supra
note 14, at 226 (noting that such a duty was held not to exist in Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)); Tauke, supra note 14, at
9, 52-53 (noting that the prevailing judicial view is that there is no fiduciary duty owed
to bondholders); Bab, supra note 29, at 856-60 (noting that fiduciary duties exist only
if the debtor is insolvent, if there has been fraud or if there has been some statutory
violation); Note, supra note 2, at 1864-65 (noting that courts have rejected the creation of such a duty). See generally Klein et al., supra note 14, at 674 n.94 (stating that
it would be impracticable to define the contours of a fiduciary duty owed by an issuer
to its bondholders or to enforce any such duty); Tauke, supra note 14, at 52-65 (discussing the merits of creating such a fiduciary duty).
43. Bratton, supra note 2, at 119-20; Riger, supra note 14, at 228-31; Tauke, supra
note 14, at 78-80. Even if covenants in indentures are not interpreted in a manner
that implements bondholders' reasonable expectations, the bondholders may have an
action under § 11 or § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2)
(1988), or Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Cf. McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that a factually
accurate description of a put right in an indenture that was triggered by certain
events, unless approved by the "Independent Directors," could be found by a jury to
be misleading where there were a number of omissions, including the omission of the
statement that "Independent Directors" had no fiduciary duty to bondholders), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 362-66 (8th
Cir.) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that a
prospectus was misleading where the prospectus did not adequately disclose that a
covenant providing refunding protection could be circumvented with another provision), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986). But see Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer
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would not be able to enter into transactions that, although not prohibited by the express terms of the covenants, nevertheless conflict with
the bondholders' reasonable expectations; and that an indenture
might be construed as a contract of adhesion, in which case such votes
might be voided.'
With the substantial amount of literature reviewing these cases, little needs to be added for the purposes of this Article. Notwithstanding the various theories proposed by commentators, there is little
support in case law for an argument by a bondholder attempting to
void a vote based on consents for which the issuer has paid a consent
fee, at least where the offer has been made to all bondholders. However, indentures frequently are governed by the law of New York or
another jurisdiction. Thus, decisions of courts in Delaware may be of
less significance than they are with respect to issues of internal corporate governance. 45

B. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939
To some extent, sterilization provisions are incorporated by reference into indentures for publicly sold bonds by virtue of the TIA.4 6 In
three contexts, the TIA provides that bonds owned by the obligor of
the bonds (or by persons controlling, controlled by or under common
control with the obligor) are disregarded in determining whether a
stated percentage of the bondholders has concurred in any action or
consent.47 Those provisions are the following: (i) a majority 8 of the
bondholders may direct the trustee's exercise of any remedy;4 9 (ii) a
corresponding provision relieving the trustee from liability for certain
acts taken in accordance with such a direction;50 and (iii) an optional
Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1538-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying the plain-

tiff-bondholder's motion for summary judgment on a claim under Rule lOb-5 that the
issuer improperly failed to disclose the issuer's ability to circumvent a covenant re-

stricting the refinancing of the bonds with debt bearing a lower rate of interest). See
generally Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Revisiting the Applicationof FederalSecurities Law to Opinionsand Estimates, 19 J. Corp. L 243, 256

n.74 (1994) (discussing the scope of disclosure obligations of reporting companies in
this context); Tauke, supra note 14, at 72-77 (discussing Harris).

44. Bab, supra note 29, at 866 (stating that indentures are not contracts of adhesion). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RIR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1521
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that publicly offered bonds should not be construed under
the law applicable to contracts of adhesion).
45. Cf. John C. Coffee Jr., Coercive Debt Tender Offers, N.Y. LI., July 19, 1990, at

5, 6 (stating that there is a "substantial chance" that a New York court would not
follow
46.
47.
48.

Katz).
Lacy & Dolan, supra note 2, at 70.
15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
Indentures provide for voting by bondholders weighted by the principal

amount of bonds owned. For simplicity, the term "majority of the bondholders" is
used in this Article to refer to persons holding bonds representing a majority in prin-

cipal amount of the relevant class of bonds.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
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provision under which the indenture may permit seventy-five percent
of the bondholders to agree to the postponement of any interest payment for up to three years.5 ' These requirements of the TIA typically
are reflected in an indenture by providing that in determining the
holders required to deliver any consent, bonds held by the issuer (or a
controlling or controlled person or a person under common control)
are disregarded.52 Plaintiffs therefore may be able to argue persuasively that reference also should be made to relevant principles of statutory construction in interpreting sterilization provisions.53
This analysis requires identification of the precise mechanics of a
consent solicitation. A consent solicitation may be structured as an
offer by the issuer on the following terms: the offer will expire at a
specified time on a specified date, subject to extension by the issuer by
announcement made not later than the close of business on the next
following business day; the issuer may withdraw the offer at any time
before the amendment is executed; and the bondholders will be free
to withdraw any consent until the amendment is executed.54
Rule 0-2(f) under the TIA defines "control" as "the power to direct
the management and policies of a person ...

whether through the

ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise. '55 Bondholders can argue that issuers have obtained control either (i) "by
contract" or (ii) "otherwise." An issuer that has obtained a consent
has obtained the right to have the bonds voted in a particular fashion.
This arrangement clearly is a contract; if a bondholder subsequently
brought suit to enforce a covenant that was amended with the bondholder's consent and for which the bondholder's consent was required, the suit would be dismissed on the basis that the issuer's action
complied with its contractual obligations as amended. Although such
an issuer does not generally control the management and policies of
the bondholders that deliver consents, the term "control" should be
interpreted as including the ability to direct the management and policies of the bondholders as they relate to the transaction or transactions in question (i.e., the bondholder vote). For example, whether
bonds are held by a firm controlled by the issuer for purposes of determining whether those bonds may be counted in a vote should not
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
52. See, e.g., Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, § 2.09.
53. Cf.Coffee, supra note 45, at 7 n.11 (stating that courts could look to the defini-

tion of the term "beneficial owner" as used in Rule 13d-3(a) under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)); Roe, supra note 2, at 249 n.47 ("The

lack of a real choice, a future court may hold, so undermines the policy of individualized consent embodied in section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act that recapitalization by such consents, like recapitalizations by vote, must be prohibited.") (citation
omitted).

54. E.g., AT&T Credit Corporation, Consent Solicitation Statement/Prospectus 21
(Mar. 10, 1993).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 260.0-2(0 (1994).
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depend on whether the issuer has the power to cause the bondholder
to declare a dividend.56
However, in these circumstances, it is not clear whether the issuer
"controls" the voting of the bonds at the time they are voted, because
the contractual power of the issuer arises only upon the effectiveness
of the vote, i.e., the contractual rights arise simultaneously with the
exercise of the vote. Fortunately, the resolution of the application of
the TIA to these arrangements does not turn on the presence or absence of an instant in time between the formation of the contractual
power to control the vote and its exercise.
The rules under the TIA expressly define control as including the
specified power, "whether through the ownership of voting securities,
'
Therefore, the functional equivalent of
by contract, or otherwise."
the bonds should be sufficient to constito
vote
power
contractual
the
'
tute "control." In a consent solicitation, the issuer will receive acceptances by the expiration date. Since the issuer is afforded
adequate time to determine whether the requisite number of consents
has been received before the issuer decides whether to postpone the
expiration date, the issuer has the ability to determine whether the
amendment is approved. This arrangement should be considered sufficient to constitute control.
It is unlikely that any bondholder would withdraw a consent during
this period, because it is unlikely that any new information will become available during that period that would cause a bondholder to
revise its assessment. Even though it is unlikely that bondholders
would withdraw their consents, the existence of the right to withdraw
means that the power to direct the vote is to some extent shared. As a
result, one could argue that no person who shares control with another independent person is a controlling person for this purpose. It is
clear, however, that an individual does not lose the status of a controlling person merely because the requisite power is shared with others.59
56. Cf. Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 402 (2d ed. 1988) ("It
does not follow, however, that one member of such a group controls in all contexts.
For example, whether a secondary distribution by one member requires registration
under the Securities Act raises essentially a question of fact in each case whether that
person has enough influence with the group to be able to obtain the issuer's signature
on a registration statement.").
57. 17 C.F.R. § 260.0-2(f) (1994) (emphasis added).
58. This argument would be less persuasive as to securities offered by a prospectus
that expressly contemplated the voting of bonds for which a consent fee shall have
been paid by the issuer. See supra note 29.
59. Loss, supra note 56, at 402 ("[C]ontrol may rest with a group of persons, such
as ... a number of business associates."); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "in Control"?S.E.C., 21 Bus. Law. 559, 576 (1966) (stating with respect to a similar definition of
"control" in Rule 405 under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405, "There are innumerable instances in which a single person does not appear to have actual operating
control or the power to control. Then the problem is to identify the group which is in
control and those who constitute the group.").
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If bondholders were to prevail in their argument that an issuer has
"control" of bondholders whose bonds are tendered in a consent solicitation, as that term is used in the rules under the TIA, it would be
difficult for an issuer to count votes obtained in a consent solicitation
for which a fee was paid. A typical indenture provides as follows: "In
determining whether the Holders of the required principal amount of
Securities have concurred in any direction, waiver or consent, Securities owned by the [issuer] or an Affiliate shall be disregarded .... 1,60
The term "Affiliate" is defined as "any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by or under direct or indirect common control with the [issuer]."' 61 These provisions implement the requirement
of the TIA described above 62 that bonds owned by the issuer not be
counted in certain votes. However, these quoted indenture terms do
not state that they apply only to the extent required by the TIA. Because no basis for construing this definition differently in different
contexts within the same indenture is evident, such an interpretation
would be anomalous. 63 Therefore, if issuers conducting consent solicitations are considered to be persons "controlling" bondholders who
deliver consents, the terms of the applicable indenture may prevent
consummation of the consent solicitation seeking to amend any provision of the indenture.
Courts deciding whether a consent solicitation is lawful have not
previously discussed this argument. In the absence of a controlling
decision, it is not certain that this argument would be successful.
However, bondholders have forceful arguments to prevent these consent solicitations.
C. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The legal context in which consent solicitations occur also involves
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"). 64 Two aspects
That a number of persons can be controlling persons is inherent in other applica-

tions of the term. Each policy-making officer is individually considered to be a controlling person. Thomas L. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 210 (2d ed. 1990)

(construing "control" as used in 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 as meaning that all a corporation's "policy-making officers" control the corporation). Since these independent persons can be controlling persons, that an individual's control of a corporation is shared
does not disqualify that person from being considered a controlling person.
60. Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, § 2.09.
61. Id. § 1.01.
62. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
63. Some indentures expressly provide that terms defined in the TIA or the rules
under the TIA that are used in the indenture have the meanings assigned in the TIA
or those rules. See, e.g., Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, § 1.03. As to
bonds issued under those indentures, the sole question is whether the issuer "controls" the bondholders who deliver a consent, as that term is used in the rules under
the TIA.
64. 15 U.S.C. §9 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Completeness requires that the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), be mentioned.
The SEC takes the position that modification of the terms of a security may, depend-
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of consent solicitations may cause the transactions to be regulated
under the 1934 Act. First, a consent solicitation for bonds, like any
other solicitation of consents, may be subject to section 14(a) of the

1934 Act.65 Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act prohibits the solicitation of

proxies or consents in respect of securities registered under section 12
of the 1934 Act6 6 in contravention of any rules promulgated by the
SEC. Since bonds are not typically listed on an exchange,67 they are
not typically registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act," and section
therefore usually is not applicable to consent
14(a) of the 1934 Act 69
solicitations for bonds.
Second, if a consent solicitation is coupled with an exchange offer,
the consent solicitation fee may be integrated into the exchange offer,
making both subject to the provisions of the 1934 Act regulating
tender offers.7" In that case, the consent solicitation/exchange offer
ing on the scope of the changes, effect the issuance of a new security. Such an issuance must be registered unless an exemption is available. See generally Bryant B.
Edwards & Jon J. Bancone, Modifying Debt Securities: The Search for the Elusive
"New Security" Doctrine, 47 Bus. Law. 571 (1992) (discussing in detail the extent to
which modification of a security's terms constitutes a new issuance); Lacy & Dolan,
supra note 2, at 60-66 (discussing the "new security" doctrine in the context of
restructurings); Coffee, supra note 45, at 7 (briefly discussing the "new security" doctrine). The timing constraints imposed by registration under the Securities Act of
1933 might impede or prevent consummation of a consent solicitation in some
contexts.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). See generally Lacy & Dolan, supra note 2, at 59
(discussing the application of the proxy rules to consent solicitations).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
67. Simplification of Filing Requirements for Debt Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34,139, 59 Fed. Reg. 29,398, 29,400 n.26 (1994).
68. If the bonds are convertible into stock, they are considered to be equity securities for purposes of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1988), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a111 (1994), and may be subject to registration under § 12(g) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(g) (1988).
69. See, e.g., E. H. I., Inc., v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 652 F.2d 310, 313-15 (3d
Cir. 1981). The SEC has proposed rules that would exempt non-convertible debt securities listed on a securities exchange from proxy regulation. Simplification of Filing
Requirements for Debt Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34,139, 59 Fed. Reg.
29,398, 29,400 (1994).
70. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1269. The authors cite Playtex FP Group Inc.,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,954 (Nov. 22, 1989 [sic]), in
which the Division of Market Regulation stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under Rule 14e-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(b), with respect to a
proposed consent solicitation/tender offer. A consent solicitation, sought for amendments to various indentures, was scheduled to expire five business days before the
expiration of the related tender offer. Playtex, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) at 78,789. The Division stated, "Because Holders must submit a Consent
to tender a class of Existing Debt Securities but will receive a Consent Payment only
for Consents submitted prior to the Solicitation Expiration Date, [the offeror] would
be required to keep the applicable Tender Offer open for a minimum period of ten
business days from the date of notice of the Solicitation Expiration Date, including
any extensions thereof." Id. at 78,790. That position assumes that the termination of
the consent solicitation constitutes a decrease in the consideration offered in the
tender offer. Id. at 78,787.
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could be subject to sections 13(e), 71 14(d) 72 and 14(e) 73 of the 1934
Act and the rules thereunder. Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act prohibits
fraudulent or manipulative practices with respect to any tender offer.74 Rule 14e-1 under the 1934 Act requires that tender offers be
held open for twenty business days (and at least ten business days
from the date of notice of an increase or decrease in the consideration
to be paid or the percentage of the class sought). 75 The rules under
section 14(e) of the 1934 Act would thus prevent an issuer from commencing a consent solicitation that would expire a short period of time
before the exchange offer if the consent solicitation were integrated
into the exchange offer.76 However, the requirements that an offer be
made to all holders,77 that the highest consideration paid in the tender
offer be paid to all holders who tender 78 and that partial offers be
prorated 79 generally would not apply to debt tender offers, as those
provisions relate only to tender offers for equity securities.80
In 1990, FMR Corp. and The Prudential Insurance Company of
America petitioned the SEC to adopt a new rule that would prohibit
the solicitation of consents from holders of securities during a tender
offer for the securities, unless the tender offer were to remain open at
least ten business days after the announcement of the results of the
consent solicitation.8 ' The petition may remain under consideration
at the SEC. 2 Staff members of the SEC have explained that the
SEC's rulemaking process is lengthy, and that the SEC's failure to act
It is not obvious why a consent solicitation for amendments to an indenture that are
sufficiently extensive to constitute the issuance of a new security under the Securities
Act, see supra note 64, should not, by definition, be an exchange offer.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
74. Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(a) (1994), unless otherwise noted, Regulation 14E, the rules under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, do not apply to tender offers for
exempted securities. Exempted securities include certain government and municipal
securities, certain funds maintained by banks and other securities designated by the
SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-5 (1994). However, Rule 14e1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1994), applies to tender offers for bonds that are not exempted securities. L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1994).
76. See Coffee, supra note 45, at 7 nn. 15-16 and accompanying text (noting that
during the mid 1980's, the staff granted no-action relief to some issuers of investment
grade debt).
77. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i), 240.14d-10(a)(1) (1994).
78. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)(ii), 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1994).
79. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(3), 240.14d-8 (1994).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78n(d)(1) (1988); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(a)(2), 240.14d1(a) (1994); E. H. I., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 652 F.2d 310, 313-15 (3d Cir.
1981) (addressing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1). But see Coffee, supra note 45, at 6 (arguing
that the proration, best price and all holders requirements should be applicable to all
debt tender offers).
81. Lacy & Dolan, supra note 2, at 68.
82. Regulatory Flexibility Agenda, Securities Act Release No. 7051, 59 Fed. Reg.
21,486, 21,491 (1994) (stating that the Divisions of Corporation Finance and Market
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as of this time does not imply that the SEC will not proceed further
with such a rule. s3
D. Conclusions

For the purposes of this Article, the most significant aspect of the
legal environment regulating consent solicitations is that consents obtained by issuers in these transactions are not necessarily void. However, consents obtained in transactions in which offers are not made in

a manner that affords all bondholders an equal ability to participate
may be suspect even if the indenture has no express terms requiring
such treatment.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONSENT SOLIcrrATION PROCESS

The situation faced by bondholders when issuers propose a consent
solicitation may be modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma.' The literature
describing the consent solicitation process as a Prisoner's Dilemma is
diverse. The analysis developed first in the related context of twostep, front end loaded acquisitions. A seminal article published in
1980 argued that companies' charters allow front end loaded acquisi-

tions to permit the elimination of free riders to the ultimate aggregate
benefit of the shareholders. 5 On a similar basis, commentators have
Regulation are considering whether to recommend proposals to amend rules applicable to debt tender offers, on an undetermined timetable).
83. Wendy R. Beer, Do Consent Solicitations, Tender Offers Need More Government Regulation?, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 15, 1993, at 2.
84. A Prisoner's Dilemma has been defined as a game with the following attributes: "Each player has two basic choices: he can act 'cooperatively' or 'uncooperatively.' When all the players act cooperatively, each does better than when all of them
act uncooperatively. For any fixed strategy (ies) of the other player(s), a player always does better by playing uncooperatively than by playing cooperatively." Morton
D. Davis, Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction 109 (rev. ed. 1983).
The traditional example involves two prisoners who have been arrested for having
participated jointly in a single criminal act. Each is offered the choice either to confess or to hold out, with the outcomes in each case represented in the following
matrix:
Prisoner 2
Hold Out
Confess
(6 mos, 20 yrs)
(5 yrs, 5 yrs)
Confess
Prisoner 1
(1 yr, 1 yr)
(20 yrs, 6 mos)
Hold Out
Sentence for (Prisoner1, Prisoner2)
See, e.g., id.; Drew Fudenberg & Jean Trole, Game Theory 9-10 (1991).
85. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation,11 Bell J. Econ. 42, 59 (1980); cf. C. Steven
Bradford, Stampeding Shareholders and Other Myths: Target Shareholdersand Hostile Tender Offers, 15 J. Corp. L. 417, 421-27 (1990) (discussing the possibilities for
coercion). The literature on such acquisitions is extensive and cannot be summarized
here.
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stated that the consent solicitation process is "coercive." 6 Some have
merely asserted that bondholders may be coerced.8 7 Others have set

forth simple quantitative examples of a single consent solicitation,
demonstrating the potentially coercive effects.88 Most recently,
Professors Kahan and Thckman have presented a game theoretic analysis demonstrating that a single consent solicitation in which a fixed
fee is offered for a consent may be coercive.8 9 This part first presents
a simple model of a consent solicitation as a Prisoner's Dilemma.
Notwithstanding collective action problems, bondholders frequently
have been able to negotiate collectively with issuers in these contexts.9° It has been stated that "issuers have not yet fully exploited the
86. E.g., Note, supra note 2, at 1863 ("[B]ondholders confront a prisoners' dilemma reminiscent of the front-loaded, two-tiered tender offers that most commentators have characterized as coercive in the context of mergers and acquisitions.").
87. Brudney, supra note 14, passim.
88. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1228-29.
89. Kahan & Thckman, supra note 2, at 504-07. In addition to a customary solicitation in which a fee is paid only if the amendment is approved, the authors also
consider a consent solicitation in which a fee is paid to each bondholder who delivers
a consent, even if the associated amendment is not approved. Id. at 506. It seems
implausible that a corporation would voluntarily make an offer in which, under some
circumstances, the corporation would be obligated to pay a fee and receive no benefit
in return. Such offers are therefore not included in the analysis described in this
Article.
90. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1218; Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 2, at 512
(noting that press releases indicated that bondholder groups formed in at least 12 of
58 consent solicitations reviewed, representing 21% of those consent solicitations, and
that 42% of issuers modified consent solicitations after an initial failure to obtain a
sufficient number of consents); Bab, supra note 29, at 878-79; Coffee, supra note 45, at
7.
Professors Kahan and Tuckman found abnormally high bond returns around the
dates on which the issuer announced a transaction that required bondholders' consent. Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 2, at 510. They suggest that this correlation supports "the hypothesis that bondholders are able to act in concert," id., in addition to
the direct evidence of bondholders forming coalitions and not approving some
amendments. This indirect evidence seems unpersuasive absent tidditional information. One would expect that issuers will often initiate consent solicitations when they
are in a dire financial position and are presenting a plan for recovery or when they
have the opportunity to engage in an unusual transaction that may offer unusually
high returns but requires bondholders' consent. One would expect a firm's securities
to increase in value upon the announcement of such a transaction. It is not clear that
the abnormal returns identified by Professors Kahan and Tuckman were not the result
of such a factor.
This effect has been identified in a related context. One study found that bonds
rated BBB or below experience positive abnormal returns for the period from two
months before the initial announcement of a transaction in which the issuer was to be
acquired through consummation. M. Mark Walker, Determinants of Bondholder
Wealth Following Corporate Takeovers (1980-1988), 33 QJ. Bus. & Econ. 12, 23
(1994) (finding the return to be statistically significant). The same study found that
bonds rated above BBB had a negative abnormal return during similar periods. Id. at
22-23. The results suggest that frequently extraordinary transactions that involve consent solicitations may benefit holders of non-investment grade debt. However, issuers
planning extraordinary transactions may try to expropriate gains that otherwise would
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potential for coercive indenture amendments," 91 which might explain
the discrepancy between predicted behavior and reality. In some contexts, the ability of a bondholder to free ride, i.e., receive the benefits
of a transaction that benefits all bondholders without bearing a proportionate share of any inherent costs, may prevent an issuer from
effectively coercing bondholders. 92 This Article argues that another
aspect of the context of the consent solicitation process can cause
bondholders presented with a consent solicitation not to be in a Prisoner's Dilemma. Professors Coffee and Klein have noted that "[a]n
important characteristic of the hypothetical facts [of the Prisoner's Dilemma] is that the 'game' is a one-shot choice involving people who
are not able to communicate with one another." 93 However, they do
not attempt to assess the significance of the assumption. This part
incorporates the possibility of repeat games and shows that, in many
circumstances, bondholders will not face a Prisoner's Dilemma.
The models in the remainder of this Article assume that there is no
simultaneous exchange offer, i.e., the consent solicitation is not an exit
consent. That assumption does not limit the generality of the analysis.
The decision made by a bondholder presented with a single consent
solicitation will depend on the value of the bonds if the consent solicitation is unsuccessful, the value of the property the bondholder will
own after delivering a consent to an amendment that is approved, 91
the value of the bonds if a consent is not delivered and the solicitation
is successful, and the probability that the consent solicitation will be
successful. These values are the relevant factors, and a bondholder
will respond in the same manner to either (i) a simple consent solicitation or (ii) a consent solicitation coupled with an exchange offer, if the
be realized by holders of investment grade debt (or to impose on them additional
risk).
91. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1250.
92. For example, a company on the verge of bankruptcy proceedings in which
bondholders could be expected to receive 20% of the face amount of their bonds
might be offered to exchange their bonds for securities worth 40% of the face amount
of the bonds, subject to the exchange of 95% of the bonds. Each holder might be
tempted to hold out and retain a bond whose value would be increased as a result of
the recapitalization. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 2, at 236-43 (citing one such case of a
holdout). See generally McDaniel, supra note 2, at 429 (discussing bondholders who
hold out); Note, supra note 2, at 1860-63 (discussing bondholders who hold out in this
context). However, another commentator stated, "[A]t least in situations when bankruptcy is not imminent, rational bondholders have good reason not to reject an otherwise acceptable offer at a premium [to the market price] merely because there is an
ambiguous possibility that holdouts may ultimately receive a larger premium." Brudney, supra note 14, at 1859.
93. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1226 n.57; see also id. at 1253; cf.Roe, supra
note 2, at 274 n.130 (noting that repeat games may foster cooperation among members of bank syndicates).
94. In the case of a consent sohcitation coupled with an exchange offer or a tender
offer, the relevant value of the property to be owned after delivering a consent is the
value of the property to be owned after consummation of the exchange offer or the
tender offer.
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two offers provide identical values of the property to be owned if the
offer is accepted, assuming the other values and the relevant
probabilities are the same.
For example, assume that there are two possible offers that an issuer may make to its bondholders. The first offer is a simple consent
solicitation in which, for each $1000 of principal amount of bonds, a
bondholder is offered $300 for a consent to an amendment that would
decrease to $500 the value of bonds having a face amount of $1000.
The second offer is a consent solicitation/exchange offer in which the
same bondholders are offered the opportunity to exchange each $1000
in face amount of bonds for new securities worth $800, while the previously outstanding bonds would be worth $500 if the amendment is
approved. As long as all bondholders assign the same values to the
various outcomes, the response of the bondholders to these two offers
will be the same, with one caveat. The value of bonds not exchanged
in an exchange offer may be affected by the percentage of the bonds
that were exchanged. For example, if the bonds delivered in exchange
are to be senior to the class of bonds as to which the offer is made, the
value of bonds that are not exchanged will be affected by the principal
amount of the bonds that are exchanged. This effect might be important to a bondholder in evaluating any particular consent solicitation.
However, such an offer is equivalent to an offer in which the range of
possible values of the unexchanged bonds as a function of the percentage of bonds tendered
is replaced by a single amount representing the
95
expected value.
The intuitive concept is that each bondholder, in deciding whether
to deliver a consent in a consent solicitation/exchange offer, weighs
the value of the bonds as they are proposed to be amended and compares that value to the value of the bonds if no amendment is made
and the sum of the value of the consent fee plus the value of the property to be received in exchange, incorporating an assessment of the
relevant probabilities. Since the value of the bonds after implementation of the amendment is considered by a bondholder in determining
whether to consent, that a consenting bondholder never holds bonds
with the amended terms does not affect the outcome of the consent
solicitation. The models of simple consent solicitations set forth below are therefore similarly predictive of the results of consent solicitations coupled with exchange offers.
95. Throughout this Article, these large, sophisticated investors are assumed to be

risk neutral, i.e., they are assumed to be indifferent among all choices with the same
expected value. An investor may eliminate unsystematic risk, which refers to risk that
affects a single asset or a small group of assets, Stephen A. Ross et al., Corporate
Finance 298 (2d ed. 1990), by owning a diverse portfolio of assets. Id. at 305; George
E. Pinches, Essentials of Financial Management 134 (4th ed. 1992); McDaniel, supra
note 2, at 436. Because most holders of bonds are institutional investors, see infra
note 105 and accompanying text, it is reasonable to assume that they will be able to

diversify their portfolios sufficiently to be risk neutral in this context.
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A. Consent Solicitations as a Single-Game Prisoner'sDilemma
It is easiest to understand a model applied to a numerical example.
Our first model of the consent solicitation process assumes that there
are two primary bondholders. Each owns $30 million in principal
amount of a class of an issuer's bonds, of which $60,000,001 are outstanding, and each primary bondholder values the bonds at 100% of
their principal amount. A third person, who owns $1 in principal
amount of bonds,96 has irrevocably consented to an amendment to the
indenture, and both primary bondholders are aware of this consent.
The amendment requires the consent of a majority of the bondholders
if it is to be approved and, if implemented, will decrease the value of
each bond to two-thirds of its face amount. The issuer makes the following offer to each of the holders of $30 million of bonds (with each
aware that the other is being made the offer): The issuer will pay a
total of $15 million if an amendment to the indenture is approved.
Each bondholder decides whether to accept without knowing whether
the other has consented. If both consent, the $15 million fee is split
equally between the two bondholders.
This situation may be represented in a familiar decision matrix:
TABLE 1:

Two BONDHOLDERS
Bondholder 2

No Consent

Consent

No Consent

(30, 30)

(20, 35)

Consent

(35, 20)

(27.5, 27.5)

Bondholder 1
Payoff to (Bondholder 1, Bondholder 2)
($ millions)

This situation presents a typical Prisoner's Dilemma. For Bondholder 1, regardless of the decision that Bondholder 2 makes, Bondholder 1 prefers to consent. Such a strategy, which yields the
participant's strictly greatest' return regardless of the strategy selected by the other participant, is called a "dominant strategy.""8 The
situation is symmetric, and Bondholder 2 similarly prefers to consent.
The result (consent, consent) is referred to as a "dominant strategy
96. Indentures typically do not permit the issuance of bonds in such a small principal amount. E.g., Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, exhibit A, 1 11 (providing for denominations of integral multiples of $1000). This amount has been selected
to present a simple illustration.
97. In this context, the term "strictly greatest" is used to exclude strategies that in
some cases yield a return that is equal to the return generated with another strategy.

See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 28,31
(1989).

98. Ild. at 28.
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equilibrium."99 However, if both consent, each is in a position that is
valued at $27.5 million, whereas if neither consents, each gains $2.5
million.
This result, which is unfortunate from the bondholders' perspective,
is typical of a Prisoner's Dilemma and is the basis for categorizing
consent solicitations as "coercive." Each bondholder would be better
off if he or she could enter into a binding contract not to consent, but
it is assumed, for various reasons, that such an agreement would not
be entered into. The consent solicitation could be made more "coercive." For example, the terms of the consent could provide that the
first bondholder to tender would receive the entire consent payment,
but those modifications are not required in the two-bondholder model
for the issuer to assure approval of the indenture modification.
This offer is unusual in that the aggregate consent fee is specified, as
opposed to the specification of a fee to be delivered for any particular
consent. This simple model is equivalent to a consent solicitation coupled with an exchange offer in which an offer is made for only $30
million of bonds with proration, i.e., a partial offer. 10° An offer structured with a fixed fee of $7.5 million for each $30 million of bonds for
which a consent is delivered, regardless of the size of the majority approving the amendment, is represented by the following matrix:
TABLE

2: Two

BONDHOLDERS WITH A FIXED CONSENT FEE
Bondholder 2

No Consent

No Consent
(30, 30)

Consent
(20, 27.5)

Bondholder 1
(27.5, 27.5)
(27.5, 20)
Consent
2)
1,
Bondholder
(Bondholder
to
Payoff
($ millions)

In this case, there are two Nash equilibria, both bondholders consenting and both bondholders not consenting. Since the preferred action to be taken by each bondholder depends on the action taken by
the other bondholder, it is difficult to predict the outcome that will be
observed in practice. It is important to note that there remains a rational outcome, both consenting, that is worse for each bondholder
than an alternative outcome, both not consenting. Since both bondholders might rationally choose to consent and achieve an undesirable
99. Id. The equilibrium is also a "Nash equilibrium," which means that no participant has an incentive to deviate from that participant's strategy if the other participant does not deviate. Id. at 33.
100. For ease of reference, this Article uses the terms "partial offer" and "offer with

proration" to identify a partial offer for consents from holders of the minimum
amount of bonds required to approve the amendment in question, in which the aggregate consent fee is specified and is split among all bondholders who consent to an
amendment that is approved.
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outcome, one might categorize this framework as potentially coercive.1 1 Possible methods
for predicting the outcome in such a context
10 2
are revisited below.

B.

Models with Multiple Bondholders

As noted above, notwithstanding these models, bondholders
presented with consent solicitations frequently are able to overcome
the collective action problems and negotiate with issuers, i.e., the attempts to coerce the bondholders frequently are not effective. 0 3 That
actors are able in practice to engage in collective decisionmaking suggests that the typical models are not properly specified, as they predict
results that do not occur. Others have attributed the ability of bondholders to resist the coercion of a Prisoner's Dilemma to vulture
funds."° However, refining the assumptions of the Prisoner's Dilemma model demonstrates that bondholders that are not vulture

funds may overcome collective action problems.
The first level of additional sophistication follows from the fact that
generally there is a small number of bondholders to whom any particular consent solicitation is addressed. It has been estimated that
ninety to ninety-five percent of publicly offered bonds are held by in101. See Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 2, at 500 (categorizing solicitations that
support such an equilibrium outcome as "structurally coercive").
102. See infra notes 124-30, 151-54 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
104. Bab, supra note 29, at 883. See generally Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at
1233-42 (analyzing coercive offers as solving hold out problems in various contexts,
including distressed corporations). Vulture funds are entities formed to purchase assets or securities of distressed properties or firms. Jerry M. Rosenberg, Dictionary of
Investing 358 (1993); Theodore J. Gage, Vulture Funds, '90s Style Often Aide Survival, Corporate Cashflow Magazine, Sept. 1993, at 53 (noting that the increased leverage incurred by companies in the 1980's created increased opportunities for these
investors); Steven Lipin, Boston Firm Puts Final Touches on "Vulture" Fund, American Banker, Sept. 28, 1990, at 1; Anne Schwimmer, Vulture Funds Draw Assets from
Top 200, Pensions & Investments, Jan. 25, 1993, at 28.
Professors Coffee and Klein suggest that the presence of vulture funds within bondholder groups reduces issuers' ability to coerce bondholders because they buy bonds
with the expectation of a significant, e.g., 30%, short term return. Coffee & Klein,
supra note 2, at 1214. It is not clear why vulture funds should demand a greater
return than other sophisticated investors, although other factors, such as the absence
of other business relationships with the issuer, may make such bondholders more willing to hold out. However, this Article below identifies another reason why the existence of vulture funds may make consent solicitations less likely to coerce
bondholders. Parts ll.C and III of this Article demonstrate that bondholders are
more likely to resist coercive offers where there is an increased likelihood that the
bondholders will be presented with a second consent solicitation in the future, by the
same or another issuer, and bondholders' voting histories are publicly available. As
vulture funds are unusually likely to be faced with subsequent consent solicitations,
their increasing prominence increases the likelihood that bondholders will be able to
resist potentially coercive offers. The likelihood that these investors may be repeat
players may therefore increase the value of the bonds to all holders.
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stitutional investors. 10 5 Ownership of most separate classes of noninvestment grade bonds typically is spread among fifteen to thirty investors. 1' 6 The composition of owners of non-investment grade bonds
is relevant because the vast majority of consent solicitations are directed to holders of non-investment grade bonds. 1' 7 As among institutional investors, non-investment grade bonds are increasingly held
by mutual funds, as opposed to insurance companies and banks, 10 8
which may affect the likelihood that bondholders will adopt confrontational strategies in response to consent solicitations.
We will assume that there are eight bondholders, 0 9 with each holding $7.5 million in face amount of bonds having a value of $7.5 million,
and that the issuer is offering an aggregate payment of $15 million in a
partial offer with proration, if the bondholders approve an amendment that would reduce the bonds' aggregate value by one-third. It is
also assumed that a majority of the bondholders is required to consent
for the amendment to be approved.
This situation also may be presented in a matrix:
TABLE 3: EIGHT BONDHOLDERS
Other Bondholders, Number Who Consent
0, 1,2or 3
4
5
6
7
No Consent (7.5, 52.5) (7.5, 52.5)
(5, 50)
(5, 50)
(5, 50)
Bondholder 1
Consent

(7.5, 52.5)

(8, 47)

(7.5, 47.5) (7.1, 47.9) (6.9, 48.1)

Payoff to (Bondholder 1, All Other Bondholders (in the Aggregate))

($ millions)

With these assumptions, no bondholder is worse off if he or she
consents. A bondholder may benefit by consenting in a number of
circumstances. Thus, one would expect a rational bondholder to consent. All bondholders consenting is again a Nash equilibrium, but it is
not a dominant strategy equilibrium, because Bondholder 1 is indiffer105. Roe, supra note 2, at 259; Bab, supra note 29, at 882 (addressing non-investment grade bonds). But see McDaniel, supra note 2, at 415 ("The bond market no
longer is (if it ever was) the exclusive domain of institutional investors able to fend for
themselves.").
106. Bab, supra note 29, at 882. This information may be slightly misspecified for
the purposes of this Article. Some bonds are issued under an open-ended indenture,
which means that more than one class or series of bonds may be issued from time to
time under the indenture. Such an indenture may provide that classes of similar securities are aggregated for purposes of determining the number of holders required to
consent to an amendment. E.g., International Business Machines Corporation, Registration Statement on Form S-3, Registration No. 33-33590, at 11 (Feb. 22, 1990). (The
author participated in the preparation of that registration statement.)
107. Kahan & Thckman, supra note 2, at 500.
108. Laura Jereski, Junk-Bond Market Had Another Record Year in 1993, Wall St.

J., Jan. 3, 1994, at 26. The author wishes to thank H. Kurt von Moltke for identifying
this point.
109. The bondholder with a $1 investment is eliminated.
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ent between consenting and not consenting if fewer than four other
bondholders consent.
However, by adding other bondholders, a more complex problem
may arise. For example, if the issuer offers $8 million, with all other
terms being the same, the situation may be represented by the following matrix:
TABLE 4: EIGHT BONDHOLDERS WITH A DECREASED

CONSENT PAYMENT
Other Bondholders, Number Who Consent
No Consent

0, 1,2or3

4

5

6

7

(7.5, 52.5)

(7.5, 52.5)

(5, 43)

(5, 43)

(5, 43)

Bondholder I

Consent
(7.5, 52.5)
(6.6, 41.4) (6.3, 41.7) (6.1, 41.9) (6, 42)
Payoff to (Bondholder 1, All Other Bondholders (in the Aggregate))
($ millions)

In this example, Bondholder 1 is better off if he or she does not
consent and four other bondholders deliver consents. However, if five
or more other bondholders deliver consents, Bondholder 1 will benefit from consenting. Since the problem is symmetric, the decision to
consent or not to consent will depend on an assessment of the likelihood that a total of four other bondholders will consent as compared
to the likelihood that five, six or seven other bondholders will consent.
The ex ante probability that fewer than four other bondholders consent is irrelevant, because each bondholder receives the same result in
that case.110
The situation in which the issuer offers an aggregate consent fee of
up to $8 million by offering $1 million to each bondholder who consents (if the amendment is approved) is illustrated in Table 5.
TABLE 5: EIGHT BONDHOLDERS WITH A DECREASED,
FIXED CONSENT PAYMENT

Other Bondholders, Number Who Consent
No Consent

0, 1,2or3

4

5

6

7

(7.5, 52.5)

(7.5, 52.5)

(5, 40)

(5, 41)

(5. 42)

Bondholder I

(6, 41)
(6, 42)
Consent
(7.5, 52.5)
(6, 39)
(6, 40)
Payoff to (Bondholder 1, All Other Bondholders (in the Aggregate))
($ millions)

This example has results similar to those of the immediately preceding model. However, the magnitude of the relative benefit of consenting is decreased in all cases, other than the case in which all
110. This assumption is reconsidered below. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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bondholders consent. In addition, the advantage of withholding a
consent if only four other bondholders consent is increased. This example demonstrates the effect of requiring that such offers not be partial offers. If the offer is a partial offer for the minimum amount of
bonds required to approve the amendment, the issuer can increase the
extent of the potentially coercive effect of the offer."'
It is difficult to draw any further conclusions from these examples.
There is no unique rational assumption that can be made as to the
probability that any other bondholder will consent. This analysis is
not entirely fulfilling, because it has not yielded a unique result, and
the expected response of the bondholders depends on the dollar
amounts involved. Moreover, since the ambiguity arises from the
small amount paid for the consent, one would expect an issuer to preclude this ambiguity by increasing the amount of the fee paid for the
consents.
C. Multiple Consent Solicitations
The previous examples considered a single consent solicitation.
This analysis may be refined by considering that bondholders may be
presented with a number of consent solicitations over a period of
years. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the principal
amounts of the bonds that are the subject of subsequent consent solicitations are identical and any discounting is neglected." 2
The intuitive concept is that if the transaction is repeated a number
of times, the participants may have a greater incentive to cooperate.
One might first try to make a simplifying assumption-that the bond111. One might argue that these two examples are not comparable and overstate
the effect of requiring the offer to be for any and all bonds. The issuer will pay less

for approving the amendment if fewer than all bondholders consent where the consent fee is a fixed amount per bond tendered. For example, in the offers pictured in
Tables 4 and 5, if seven bondholders deliver consents, the issuer pays an aggregate
consent fee of $8 million where the offer is a partial offer, while the issuer pays only
$7 million where the fee is a fixed amount per consent.

It is nevertheless reasonable to compare these two offers on this basis. These two
examples are included to demonstrate the possible effect of requiring an issuer to
make the offer for all bonds, which is discussed infra at notes 152-53 and accompany-

ing text. In that context, an issuer may formulate its aggregate fee to be paid by first
determining the aggregate value of the bonds if no amendment is made to the indenture and comparing that value to the value of the property to be owned by all bondholders, other than the consent fee, if the bondholders consent to the amendment.
The issuer may then formulate an aggregate consent fee representing some fraction of

the excess. An issuer might decide that if a fixed fee is used (i.e., an offer for all
bonds), the issuer can afford to make the fee slightly higher, because fewer than all

bondholders may consent. However, it seems plausible that an issuer would reject
such a fee structure, because it would create a possibility that the issuer would place
the bondholders in a better position than they were before the offer.
112. The absence of discounting will be partially offset by the expectation that the

principal amount of bonds that are the subject of a consent solicitation in the future
may be larger, on average.
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holders would be presented with a fixed number of consent solicita-

tions in the future. Unfortunately, that assumption would eviscerate
the assumption of multiple transactions. If each bondholder would be
better off by consenting, backwards induction would unravel the problem. Each bondholder would deliver a consent for the last consent
solicitation. However, each bondholder would also deduce that everyone would consent in the last solicitation and would therefore consent

in the penultimate solicitation. This reasoning would be applied
recursively, and each bondholder
would ultimately decide to consent
3
in the first solicitation."

However, the assumption of a specified number of iterations is not
realistic. A more plausible assumption is that each bondholder believes that there is a finite, non-zero probability that any consent solicitation will be followed by another consent solicitation' with respect
to another class of bonds. It is assumed that each bondholder will
choose one of two strategies: (i) a "grim" strategy of withholding consent only if no other bondholder previously consented or (ii) "cheating," i.e., always consenting. This analysis also assumes that
Bondholder 1 owns one percent of the outstanding principal amount
of the relevant class of bonds, that the amendment requires the consent of 100oa percent of the bondholders to be approved, that Bondholder 1 knows that 100oc-1 percent of the bonds are held by

113. This situation is referred to as the "Chainstore Paradox." Rasmusen, supra
note 97, at 88.
114. This type of assumption is frequently employed in game theory. See e.g.,
Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict 364-65 (1991) (addressing
repeated games with a discount factor); Rasmusen, supra note 97, at 93; Jean-Francois
Mertens, Repeated Games, reprinted in Game Theory and Applications 77 (Tatsuri
Ichiishi et al. eds., 1990); Eric Rasmusen, JudicialLegitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10
J.L. Econ. & Organization 63 (1994) (analyzing stare decisis as a repeated game). The
theoretical analysis in this part II relies heavily on Rasmusen, supra note 97, a general
textbook on game theory. An approach similar to that contained in this part II.C of
this Article, but concerning repeated games with a discount factor, is contained in
Myerson, supra, at 323-52. The particular application contained in this Article of the
intellectual tools of game theory does not purport to be a novel development in game
theory. Moreover, that the results of a consent solicitation may be affected by the fact
that the game may be repeated also should not be considered unique. This possibility
in this context and related contexts has been expressed to the author by H. Kurt von
Moltke, a practitioner, over a number of years. Similarly, the value of reputations
and the significance of "repeat plays" has been discussed qualitatively by legal commentators in corporate law contexts. E.g., McDaniel, supra note 2, at 434 (stating that
for market constraints to cause issuers not to exploit bondholders that benefit from
inadequate covenants, there must be "repeat plays"); Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton,
Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1033, 1055-56, 1061
(1994) (stating that reputations can "resolve" the Chainstore Paradox, and qualitatively discussing the value of "implicit contracting" in repeated games in which it
would be costly to negotiate and enforce explicit agreements). However, the author is
not aware of any other application of these principles to this context with the assumptions contained in this part II.C on the basis articulated in part I.E.
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miscellaneous investors who will deliver consents 115 and that the remaining bondholders are institutional investors who may be repeat
players and whose history with respect to delivering consents is public
information. Bondholder 1 also assumes that no other institutional
investor cheats. These assumptions create an upper bound on the "coercion" imposed on each bondholder, by assuming that each relevant
bondholder holds the crucial vote, and therefore these assumptions
test whether Bondholder 1, and all other relevant bondholders, face a
Prisoner's Dilemma.
The following variables are defined in the model: 0 equals the
probability that there will be a following consent solicitation, f equals
the aggregate fee paid by the issuer for the consents, 116 a equals the
expected value of the bonds held by Bondholder 1 for a particular
consent solicitation where every bondholder agrees with the other
bondholders (i.e., they do not deliver consents) and g equals the expected value of the bonds held by Bondholder 1 in the grim outcome
in which everyone consents. If Bondholder 1 cheats in the first consent solicitation, with a probability 0 Bondholder 1 will receive a second consent solicitation, in which case the bonds subject to the
solicitation would have a value of g. The expected value of that possible second consent solicitation is given by

e(g+

f
100

because all bondholders will consent, causing the fee to be divided
among all bondholders. If Bondholder 1 receives a second consent
solicitation, there is a similar likelihood that the bondholder will receive a third consent
solicitation, and so on. This series is given by the
17
following sum:

(g+

01fff

L0 f)

+ o(g+

)+W(g+

)+ o3(g +

=g+---f+[6][~~

115. The percentage required for most amendments under the Model Simplified
Indenture is 66.7%. Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, § 9.02. Professors Coffee and Klein have stated that most indentures require approval by a supermajority to
amend covenants. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1223 n.50.
116. This fee is to be distributed pro rata among bondholders who deliver a
consent.
equals
117. Recall that if 0<1, the following series, 0 + 02 + 0 + ....
T-"k This result is arithmetically equivalent to the value of an infinitely repeated
game where each successive play of the game has a discounted value. See Rasmusen,
supra note 97, at 90. This formula may be familiar from the context of gross-ups of
amounts paid to employees to provide net payments after deducting federal income
taxes.
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Similarly, the value of not cheating would be given by:
a+Oa +

2

a+O0a+ ....a + [!--2]a

The profit (or loss) from cheating will equal the difference between
these two sums. If the value of cooperating with the other bondholders in all solicitations exceeds the value of cheating in the first game
and receiving the grim outcome in all subsequent solicitations, Bondholder 1 will not face a Prisoner's Dilemma. By setting the value of
the two sums equal to each other, the critical value for the probability
that there will be a second consent solicitation, OcPJTICAL, can be derived. If the probability that there will be a second consent solicitation is greater than OCRflCAL, a bondholder who knew that he or she
had the deciding vote would withhold a consent, because the benefit
of having the other bondholders hold out in future consent solicitations would outweigh the benefit from cheating in the first consent
solicitation.
We define y as representing the fraction that the aggregate consent
fee paid represents of the excess of the aggregate value of the bonds if
there is no amendment over the aggregate value of the bonds if the
amendment is approved. More succinctly, y is the fraction of the gains
that is shared with the bondholders." 8 The result, derived in the Appendix, is as follows:

OCRTCAL

=

[a[

1+ Nia[

J
]

A few aspects of this result merit identification. If the fraction of
the gains that the issuer offers to share with bondholders is less than
the percentage required to approve the amendment, 119 Bondholder 1
will not be in a Prisoner's Dilemma. Other examples may illustrate
this result. If three-quarters of the gains are paid to bondholders as a
consent solicitation fee and two-thirds of the bondholders are required to approve the amendment, Bondholder 1 will not be in a Prisoner's Dilemma if there is at least a thirty-two percent chance that
there will be a second consent solicitation. 120 The significance of the
supermajority voting requirements is highlighted by considering that if
three-quarters of the gains are paid to the bondholders as a consent
solicitation fee and only fifty-one percent of the bondholders are re118. Algebraicaly, f = y (lOOa-lOOg).
119. This assumption may be expressed arithmetically as y<o.
120. Arithmetically, if y-75 and a.=.67, OCtRMCAL=.3 2 .
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quired to approve the amendment, the probability that there will be a
second consent solicitation must be at least sixty-five
percent if Bond121
holder 1 is not to be in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
The model indicates that unless the aggregate consent fee represents substantially all the gains from the amendment to the indenture,
bondholders will not be presented with a Prisoner's Dilemma if the
governing indenture has a supermajority provision and bondholders
believe that there is a significant possibility that there will be a second
consent solicitation. There is a possibility, however, that an issuer
could compel bondholders to consent by offering to share substantially all the gains. In addition, issuers that may have to reenter the
capital markets may not be willing to incur the wrath of bondholders,
who may feel wronged if they are placed in a Prisoner's Dilemma, if
the majority of the benefit of the transaction must nevertheless be
shared with the bondholders." 2
This analysis also highlights the importance of the prohibition in the
TIA on the impairment of a bondholder's right to principal or interest."2 If the amendment is approved, issuers structuring a consent
solicitation may modify the value of the bonds by varying the nature
of the changes in the covenants (or, in the case of an exchange offer,
varying the terms of the new securities). They also may modify the
amount of the aggregate consent fee. To make a consent solicitation
more "coercive," an issuer might either increase the aggregate fee or
decrease the post-consent value of the bonds. This provision of the
TIA creates a floor on the value of the bonds after the consent solicitation and therefore restricts an issuer's ability to coerce bondholders
by substantially decreasing the post-amendment value of the bonds.
If the offer is instead structured as a specified fee of y(a-g) paid in
successful solicitations to each one percent of the outstanding bonds
for which a consent is delivered, the result is simpler. The value of
cheating in the first play will exceed the value of not consenting only if
7>1.
D. The Significance of Nash Equilibria
That some institutional investors have petitioned the SEC to adopt
additional rules protecting bondholders 2 1 indicates that, at a minimum, bondholders sometimes feel pressured into delivering a consent.
The above discussion has carefully avoided predicting that bondholders will present a united front to issuers in any particular context. For
example, reviewing the single-game example depicted in Table 5, all
121. Arithmetically, if y=.75 and a=.51,

OcRrlIcAL=.6 5 .

The results are sensitive to

changes in the percentage of the gains split with the bondholders. If y=.8 and a=.67,
49

OcRrrTcAL=.

,

and if r=.8 and a=.51, OCTIrcAL=.7 4 .

122. See infra note 141.
123. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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bondholders consenting and no bondholders consenting are both
Nash equilibria. Game theory has provided a sub-category of Nash
equilibria-trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria, which has been
described as requiring that each strategy "must continue to be optimal
for the player even if there is a small chance that the other player will
pick some out-of-equilibrium action (that the other player's hand will
'tremble')."' 12 Professors Kahan and Tuckman have shown that both
those equilibria in the single-game example depicted in Table 5, all
bondholders consenting and no bondholders consenting, are trembling hand perfect. 2 6

If the goal of the analysis is to predict the outcome of the game,
there is not always an obvious way in which to select one of a number
of Nash equilibria. In addition, the play in games may not be predicted accurately by the Nash equilibria.' 27 Attempting to predict the
results of the consent solicitation therefore would be much more complex than the analysis set forth above. 128 In particular, such an analysis would have to include the possibility that more bondholders than
the critical number delivered consents, decreasing the return from
cheating. 129 If the value of the worst outcome, not consenting where
the amendment is approved, is substantially worse than the other options, that disparity, coupled with an uncertainty as to the likelihood
of the various outcomes, may make a bondholder unwilling to hold
out in the hope of obtaining the most preferred option of all bondholders holding out. 130 As demonstrated above, bondholders often
will not be in a Prisoner's Dilemma when they are presented with consent solicitations and those bondholders will not always have a dominant strategy of delivering a consent.
E. Reexamination of the Assumptions
These examples have assumed that the issuer has to pay the same
amount to each bondholder who delivers a consent. That requirement
is integral to limiting issuers' powers of coercion. If the aggregate
payments to bondholders are greater than the decrease in the bonds'
value arising from the amendment, i.e., the bondholders have an aggregate increase in wealth, it is difficult to argue that the bondholders
are being coerced. If this situation is nevertheless described as "coer125. Rasmusen, supra note 97, at 109.
126. Kahan & Thckman, supra note 2, at 506.
127. See David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling 31 (1990).
128. See generally id at 133-85 (discussing Nash equilibria and alternatives).
129. For example, a more detailed analysis might assume that there are 20 bondholders and weigh the payoff to a bondholder assuming that there was an equal, independent probability that any other bondholder would consent, which would permit
creation of a probability distribution for the payoff to the bondholder if he or she
consented or failed to consent.
130. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text for a model incorporating these
modifications.
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cive," it is difficult to muster sympathy for the bondholders' plight.
However, the issuer might be able to create a frenzy and force the
delivery of consents if it did not make the offer to all holders or if it
accepted the consents for a portion of the bonds on a first-come, firstserved basis. The right of bondholders to receive any offer given to
other bondholders, implied by the court in Kass v. EasternAir Lines,
Inc.,' 3 ' is therefore critically important. Perhaps it should not be surprising that since consent solicitations have become more common,
some participants in offerings of non-investment grade debt have provided in the respective indentures that any such fees for consents must
be offered to all holders. 32
This analysis identifies the reason why bondholders may act collectively. One might object to this analysis on the basis that it has assumed that the same bondholders participate in each consent
solicitation and that the bondholders know whether the other bondholders have cheated in the past, since bond holdings generally are
not required to be publicly disclosed. 33 As the investment bank that
34
originally underwrote the debt often makes a market in the debt,
that firm may have a very good idea who owns the bonds and therefore may be in a position to facilitate dissemination of that information. However, just as an underwriter is between the conflicting
interests of the issuer and the prospective bondholders when cove131. 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 1074, 1082 (Del. Ch.), appeal refused, 518 A.2d 983 (Del.

1986); see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
132. The author's review of the prospectuses for 58 bond offerings in the last quarter of 1993 that were rated below Baa by Moody's disclosed 5, or 9%, that included
contractual limitations on the extent to which the issuer could offer payments for
consents to fewer than all bondholders. The use of such a provision is a recent devel-

opment. For example, the Model Simplified Indenture, published in 1983, contains no
such provision. Professors Coffee and Klein have proposed that indentures be revised

to provide, with respect to consent solicitations coupled with exchange offers, that
bondholders have the right to vote against an amendment without sacrificing the right
to exchange if the bondholders approve the amendment. Coffee & Klein, supra note

2, at 1244.
133. Rule 13d-1 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1994), obligates any

person who beneficially owns more than five percent of a class of equity securities to
disclose that ownership in a public filing. Since most bonds are not equity securities,
see supra note 68 and accompanying text, bondholders frequently are not required to
identify the bonds that they own.
Although this provision does not require bondholders to identify their holdings,
other provisions of the federal securities law might require disclosure of bond holdings. For example, reporting companies might be obligated to disclose their ownership of a particular class of bonds if that ownership were material to understanding

the financial position of the reporting company.
134. The prospectus for debt often includes a statement that an underwriter has
informed the issuer that the underwriter intends to make a market in the bonds (but is
not obligated to do so). E.g., Ralphs Grocery Company, Prospectus, $400,000,000
14% Senior Subordinated Debentures Due 2000, at 58 (Aug. 18, 1988); Wainoco Oil
Corporation, Prospectus, $40,000,000 73 % Convertible Subordinated Debentures
Due 2014, at 34 (July 6, 1989); Willcox & Gibbs, Inc., Prospectus, $50,000,000 7%
Convertible Subordinated Debentures Due 2014, at 24 (Aug. 1, 1989).
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nants are negotiated, 135 an underwriter will be subject to conflicting
pressures during a consent solicitation. The bondholders with whom
the underwriter placed bonds, and with whom the underwriter may
wish to place bonds in the future, may seek information concerning
the identities of the other bondholders. However, the underwriter's
valuable prospects for underwriting future offerings may be jeopardized by assisting bondholders in this context. In fact, the issuer might
separately engage the underwriter to facilitate the consent solicitation.
As a result, underwriters may ultimately decline to facilitate the exchange of information among bondholders. In any event, it is irrelevant whether investment bankers form a material link in the
dissemination of information concerning the bondholders or whether
others play a more vital role. Empirical evidence demonstrates that
the bondholders in the past frequently have been able to take collective action,'136 so there is some mechanism by which the identities of a
significant percentage of bondholders is disseminated.
The assumption that the same group of investors is faced with the
consent solicitation does not undermine the analysis. Reality is probably more accurately reflected by assuming that the bondholders are
randomly selected. 37 However, each bondholder generally will act in
a similar fashion under this relaxed assumption, as long as the investors in all groups are aware of each investor's history of voting. Bondholder l's grim strategy is based on being paired with a fellow
institutional bondholder that previously delivered a consent (and who
therefore may cheat in the present solicitation). Whether Bondholder
1 actually lost money as a result of the other bondholder's prior cheating is not relevant to Bondholder l's choice of a strategy. Each consent may be directed to a group of bondholders consisting of some
investors to whom one or more consent solicitations have been previously directed and others who have not previously received consent
solicitations. There is no obvious, universal reason to conclude that
this fact would significantly affect the analysis set forth above, which
has been constructed to analyze the general effect of the possibility of
subsequent consent solicitations (and not to predict the result in any
particular consent solicitation). The model in part IlI may partially
accommodate that additional complexity.
The role of the investment bank that originally underwrote the debt
in making a market also may provide another relationship that will
diminish the benefit to bondholders from cheating. An interesting ar135. See supra note 15.
136. See supra note 90.
137. There may be some correlation, however, because an underwriter may be
more likely to sell debt securities to a particular subset of the investing public. Cf. 1

Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 335 n.31 (3d ed. 1989) (citing a
study that found that certain types of firms and industries tend to engage specific
investment banks for their underwriting business).
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ticle by David Hirshleifer and Eric Rasmusen concludes that the prospect of banishment from a group in which it is profitable to belong
may permit the group to avoid free-riding. 138 If the paradigm of trading of bonds is that the underwriter makes a market by selling to, and
buying from, a group of customers with whom the underwriter also
places equity securities in initial public offerings, investment banks
that are aligned with the bondholders may have another tool to prevent cheating. As stocks typically rise from ten to fifteen percent immediately following their initial offering, 139 any bondholder that
cheats on other bondholders may find that it has more limited opportunities to purchase stocks at the initial offering price.' 40 There may
be a similar limit on the extent to which issuers attempt to create truly
coercive solicitations
if they expect to issue underwritten securities in
4
the future.' '
It is important to recognize the restriction of the analysis to the possible strategies analyzed above. 142 Although this limit on the analysis
in this Article seems reasonable, there may be alternative, plausible
assumptions that would provide contrary results. For example, one
could assume that a bondholder followed a "mixed strategy," in which
the bondholder's action in any particular situation is randomly selected (although the actions need not have the same probability of
being selected). 43 Mixed strategies have not been considered, as it
seems sufficiently implausible that bondholders would adopt such a
strategy to justify incorporation of the greater complexity required to
analyze mixed strategies.'" It is more difficult to dismiss alternative
138. David Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma with Ostracism, 12 J. Econ. Behav. & Organization 87, 105 (1989).
139. See Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Performanceof Common Stock New Issues, 2 J.
Fin. Econ. 235,235 (1975) (11.4%); Robert E. Miller & Frank K. Reilly, An Examination of Mispricing, Returns, and Uncertaintyfor Initial Public Offerings, Fin. Mgmt.,
Summer 1987, at 33, 34, 38 (9.9%); Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. Fin. 3, 3 (1991) (16.4%).

140. This Article does not attempt to quantify this additional incentive, which may
in fact not be significant. It is mentioned only for completeness. Cf. Roe, supra note
2, at 275 n.130 (noting that recalcitrant banks may not be offered the opportunity to
participate in subsequent loan syndications).

141. Cf. Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1254 n.136 (noting that the market did not
well receive an issue of bonds by an issuer that had previously aggressively interpreted a protective covenant to the detriment of its bondholders); Kahan & Tuckman,

supra note 2, at 508 ("[Coercive] proposals may hurt the issuer's reputation and increase its future costs of raising capital."); Tauke, supra note 14, at 49 ("The need to

return regularly to the bond market for raising capital will serve as a deterrent to such
corporations' taking action contrary to the best interests of the bondholders and
thereby increasing their future costs of capital.").
142. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.

143. See Rasmusen, supra note 97, at 69.
144. Intuition suggests that any person who is delegated the power by his or her
employer to decide whether a consent should be delivered will hesitate to adopt a

strategy based on a random selection. Such a strategy might be difficult to justify if
the outcome were poor.
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pure strategies, such as a grim strategy that is pursued only for a limited number of future games in response to some other bondholder's
cheating or more complex strategies combining cheating and cooperating. In some contexts, this type of strategy may be most successful.145 It is not feasible to identify and analyze all plausible strategies
and strategy combinations, which may be very numerous. For this
reason, this Article has assumed the adoption of a simple strategy that
seems at least as plausible as other, more complex strategies.
F. The Need for Relief for Issuers
Bondholders' failure to approve any particular amendment may adversely affect the ability of a company to enter into a transaction that
benefits the firm as a whole. One might therefore consider whether
the regulatory environment should enhance companies' ability to coerce bondholders. If the bonds are subject to redemption, the question is really whether a firm should be able to enter into a transaction
that benefits shareholders and thereby allocate some new, additional
risk to bondholders who may not share in the benefits of the transaction."4 Even if the bonds may not be redeemed, indentures often
provide that the covenants may be "defeased," i.e., that failure to
comply with the covenants will no longer permit the trustee to declare
the bonds to be in default, upon delivery to the trustee of funds or
government securities that will meet the scheduled payments on the
bonds. 47 The author's review of fifty-eight prospectuses for bonds
issued in the fourth quarter of 1993 that were rated below Baa by
Moody's disclosed fifty that had some type of defeasance provision. 11s
It strains credulity to argue that public bondholders (or, perhaps more
accurately, the underwriters' counsel) seriously bargain for the omission of a defeasance provision to retain the power to hold up transactions beneficial to the issuer, although bondholders may properly be

145. See Rasmusen, supra note 97, at 119-20 (noting a round-robin tournament for
a 200-repetition Prisoner's Dilemma game in which participants competed against a
single competitor in each round and strategies could not be updated during play that
was won by a strategy of tit-for-tat, i.e., cooperating in the first round and thereafter
choosing the opponent's play in the prior round, even though the strategy would not

beat any other strategy in a one-on-one contest).
146. See generally Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1216 (discussing the characterization of coercion as either permitting issuers to evade their contractual obligations or
solving the problem of holders who hold out).
147. Klein et al., supra note 14, at 661 n.32; Model Simplified Indenture, supra note

2, § 8.01.
148. See also, eg., Rievman v. Burlington N. R.R., 618 F. Supp. 592, 594, 601, 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting a preliminary injunction to holders of secured bonds who
wished to prevent the issuer's substitution of U.S. government securities for the
collateral).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

concerned with the type of securities that may be delivered to defease
the covenants. 49
The absence of a defeasance provision in some indentures is more
likely a result of counsel using an old precedent when the indenture is
prepared, or the absence of any significant financial covenants in the
indenture, diminishing the provision's utility.' 50 In this context, the
plight of issuers that do not have defeasance provisions in their indentures merits no more attention.
III.

REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF ALL VoTEs

The previous models have indicated that in many circumstances,
bondholders that are the subject of a consent solicitation will not be
presented with a Prisoner's Dilemma. The models neglected consent
solicitations in which the proposed amendment was not approved.
This assumption reflects the expectation that the identities of bondholders who consent will be less accessible if the amendment is not
approved. However, the assumption understates the disadvantages of
delivering a consent, and it is not clear that the assumption is accurate.
If the bondholders knew that a particular bondholder had "cheated"
in a prior consent solicitation, the other bondholders would probably
expect that bondholder to cheat in the present consent solicitation,
independent of whether the prior consent solicitation was approved.
One method of diminishing issuers' ability to coerce bondholders
would be to require public disclosure of the names of beneficial holders of some material amount of bonds and identification of those who
have previously delivered a consent to an amendment in exchange for
a fee. These modifications would be less intrusive than a ban on consent solicitations but would nevertheless facilitate market discipline of
bondholders who cheat on other bondholders.' 5
Part II.C of this Article highlights the importance of analyzing in
some detail economic arguments. It is difficult to adopt or reject naked assertions that bondholders may be coerced without undertaking
149. As a technical matter, the indenture may provide that the covenants are not
defeased until the preference period for the transfer of the securities to the trustee
has passed. An indenture also may permit "complete defeasance," under which
bondholders lose not only their covenant protection but also relinquish their right to
pursue any claim for payment against the issuer (although the trustee and the issuer
may remain obligated to perform certain ministerial functions, such as facilitating exchanges of the securities). Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 2, § 8.01 note 8. A

discussion of the potential consequences of a defeasance under the Internal Revenue
Code or the Investment Company Act of 1940 is beyond the scope of this Article.

150. However, a defeasance provision may be useful to avoid other covenants, such
as a restriction on mergers.
151. One might argue that bondholders would find public availability of the names
of bondholders and their prior voting records to be more intrusive than an outright
ban on exit consent solicitations and the payment of a fee in a consent solicitation.

There is no obvious basis on which to judge that objection in the absence of a survey
of bondholders.
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an analysis such as that contained in part I.C. Similarly, although
mandating disclosure of the identities of bondholders who accept consent solicitations for a fee seems likely to decrease the value of cheating, further analysis is required to determine whether the beneficial
impact of such a rule would be significant in practice and outweigh the
intrusion of the rule. A final, less conventional economic model is
considered to assess the efficacy of such a regulation.
This model makes the following assumptions: a consent solicitation
is presented to the holders of a class of bonds that is owned by twenty
bondholders, each owning five percent of the class; at least two-thirds
of the bondholders are required to approve the amendment; the bondholders adopt one of two strategies, (i) always consenting, i.e., cheating, and (ii) not consenting in the first solicitation and consenting in
the second consent solicitation only if more than fifty percent of the
bondholders are known to have consented in a prior consent solicitation;"5 2 the bondholder being analyzed, Bondholder 1, assumes that
there is an equal likelihood that any other bondholder will be of either
of the two types; and the probability that there will be a second consent solicitation is one-half. These specific assumptions are selected to
create a representative example; a more general model would be too
complex for the purposes of this Article.
Part B of the Appendix demonstrates that if all cheating is publicly
disclosed after the consent solicitation is terminated, and the aggregate consent fee is prorated among all consenting bondholders in a
partial offer, the aggregate consent fee must be greater than seventyeight percent of the gains in the consent solicitation if Bondholder 1 is
to have a higher expected value from always cheating. However, if
cheating is publicly disclosed only if a consent solicitation is approved,
the aggregate consent fee must be greater than sixty-two percent of
the gains if Bondholder 1 is to have a higher expected value from
always cheating. This example indicates that requiring disclosure of
all consents may have a significant effect on bondholders' decisions.
If the consent fee is not prorated among consenting bondholders in
a partial offer, so that the fee paid to each bondholder who consents
to an amendment that is approved equals y(a-g), and bondholders'
votes always become public, the fraction of the gains that must be
shared with bondholders must equal at least eighty-eight percent if a
bondholder is to have a higher expected value from cheating. The
import of this result merits reemphasis. This model does not contain
the uncertainty of the models in part II, where two outcomes were
plausible. If Bondholder 1 believes that each other bondholder is
equally likely to select either strategy,15 3 that there is a fifty percent
152. Where consents are made public only if the amendment is approved, a bondholder will have knowledge that more than one-half of the bondholders consented
only where the first consent solicitation is successful.
153. The bondholders are assumed to make their random selection independently.
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chance of a second consent solicitation and that two-thirds of the
bondholders are required to approve the amendment and all votes
beconie public, Bondholder 1 will hold out unless the fee equals or
exceeds eighty-eight percent of the gains of the transaction.
The prospect of future consent solicitations also may cause a bondholder to withhold consent where all information concerning cheating
is publicly available in subsequent consent solicitations even if he or
she believes that each other bondholder is more likely to cheat than to
hold out. For example, if all votes become public, two-thirds of the
bondholders are required to approve the amendment, the consent fee
is not prorated (i.e., the offer is not partial), there is a sixty-seven percent chance that there will be a subsequent consent solicitation and
the bondholder believes that there is a sixty percent chance that any
other bondholder will cheat, the consent fee must equal or exceed seventy-three percent of the gains if Bondholder 1 is not to hold out.
The term "gains" refers to the difference between the value of the
bonds, as amended, and the pre-amendment value of the bonds. If the
proposed amendment would decrease the value of the bonds by fifty
percent and the offer were for all bonds, with =.88, a bondholder who
consented to an amendment that was approved would have property
equal to ninety-four percent of the bonds' original value. The ability
of issuers to coerce their bondholders is substantially restricted where
the proposed amendment cannot entirely eliminate the post-amendment value of the bonds. This aspect of the model again highlights the
importance of the provisions of the TIA that limit the scope of the
amendments. 54 Without these provisions (or a similar contractual arrangement), an amendment could decrease the post-amendment value
of the bonds to zero, increasing the issuer's powers of coercion.
Again, the vast array of plausible strategy combinations makes impracticable any attempt to specify fully all possible outcomes. This
model has nevertheless demonstrated that where there is a significant
possibility that bondholders may be presented with a second consent
solicitation, requiring all votes to be made public after the vote is
taken on the amendment may materially limit an issuer's ability to
coerce bondholders. In addition, the possibility of subsequent consent
solicitations may limit an issuer's ability to coerce bondholders, even
where each bondholder believes that it is more likely than not that
each other bondholder will cheat. This model provides a basis for understanding why bondholders may withhold consent to amendments
that others' models have characterized as coercive.
CONCLUSION

This Article has considered the opportunity of issuers to compel
bondholders to approve various indenture amendments. This Article
154. See supra notes 10, 123 and accompanying text.
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has attempted to explain why bondholders have been able to act collectively and resist offers others have identified as coercive. The possibility of subsequent consent solicitations may play a major role in
bondholders' ability to act collectively, which has arisen in practice.
This Article also has demonstrated that bondholders' access to the
identities of other bondholders and the response of those other bondholders to prior consent solicitations may significantly limit an issuer's
ability to coerce bondholders. However, since there are no formal
mechanisms by which that information is disseminated, the outcome
of any particular consent solicitation may be materially affected by a
factor unrelated to the merits of the offer-the extent to which information is available as to the particular class of bonds. Moreover, if
underwriters play a material role in the dissemination of that information, individuals considering the regulatory environment might be
concerned with the possibility that issuers could choke dissemination
of crucial information by engaging the investment bank that originally
underwrote the bonds in question to perform other services, with the
express or implied understanding that the identities of bondholders
would not be publicly disseminated.
This Article does not purport to conclude that regulatory intervention is necessary in this context. The purchasers of bonds generally
are sophisticated investors able to understand the risks they are assuming. In the absence of a disparity in bargaining power or sophistication, there is a diminished need to regulate these purely commercial
transactions. However, this Article has identified a less intrusive alternative to be considered if regulatory restrictions on consent solicitations are to be proposed-mandatory disclosure of actions that
bondholders take in response to consent solicitations for publicly held
bonds. An economic analysis indicates that this regulatory revision
would materially limit the extent to which corporations could "coerce" their bondholders. The advantage gained by regulating consent
solicitations in this fashion is that the mechanism permits the market
to determine which amendments should be approved. Some transactions requiring bondholder consent may increase the value of each
class of securities. Alternative regulations based on attempting to ban
specific categories of consent solicitations may ultimately harm bondholders, by eliminating the ability of bondholders and issuers to agree
to mechanisms that can police investors who improperly hold out.
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APPENDIX
A.

II.C

MULTIPLE BONDHOLDERS-MODEL FROM PART

Assumptions:
1. Bondholder 1 owns 1% of the outstanding principal amount of the
bonds.
2. To approve the amendment, bondholders holding more than
100a% of the bonds must consent, where a<1, and bondholders
holding 100(a-.01)% of the bonds are known to have granted irrevocable consents.
3. The aggregate fee paid to all bondholders who consent is equal to
y(lOOa-lOOg), where y-1.

4. Terms a and g are as defined in the text.
For Bondholder 1, the value of cheating is given by the following
sum:
.01
-lOOg) + 0(g + -1(a - g)) + 02(g + y(a - g)) +.
g + -y(100a

20a1-

+ .Ogy(lOOa - lOOg) +

0 (g + 'y(a - g))

The value of not cheating is given by the following sum:
a+Oa+O2 a+ ....

a+ T0 a

Setting the two values equal to each other yields the following:
0

0

y
g +-

(a - g)+ -

1-0

(g+y(a-g))=a+ -

1-0

a

Simplifying and solving for OCRITCAL yields
(a - g)(1 -y)
10
(g- a) + -1

a

1-0

,,1
1+

a~x ][1]y

We can quantitatively demonstrate the accuracy of our assumption
that maximizing OCRITICAL is achieved by assuming y approaches 1. De-

fine

O(CIY)=OCRITIcAL.

to Y:

Taking the partial derivative of E with respect
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1-at
a
1- ) 2

1_+

Since this partial derivative is always positive if O<a<l, and we are
only concerned with consent solicitations where O<a<!, G is maximized by maximizing y.
If the fee were structured as a fee of y(a-g) for each bondholder,
independent of the number of bondholders who consented, the analysis is as follows:

0

g+y(a-g)+ 1-

B.

(g +,I(a - g)) = a

1
0

=

l

MULTIPLE BONDHOLDERS-MODEL FROM PART

III

Assumptions:
1. Bondholder 1 owns 5% of the outstanding principal amount of the
bonds; the remaining bonds are owned by 19 other investors, each
owning 5%.
2. Two-thirds of the bondholders must agree to the amendment for it
to be approved.
3. If the consent fee is prorated in a partial offer, there is an aggregate fee paid to all bondholders who consent, f, equal to Y(20a20g). If the consent fee is not prorated among consenting bondholders, and the offer is for any and all bonds, each bondholder
who consents is paid a fee of y(a-g) if the amendment is approved.
4. Terms a and g are as defined in the text.
5. There is a 50% likelihood, 0, that the same bondholders will be
presented with a subsequent consent solicitation.
6. Define n as the number of bondholders, other than Bondholder 1,
who cheat in the first consent solicitation.
1. A Bondholder's Vote Always Becomes Public
Bondholder 1 may select one of two strategies:
(a) always consenting (i.e., cheating) or
(b) not cheating in the first consent solicitation and consenting
in subsequent solicitations only if more than 50% of the bondholders cheated in the first consent solicitation.
This percentage has been selected because if a consent solicitation is
almost approved in the first transaction, some bondholders who did

790

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

not cheat in the first transaction may find the prospect of cheating too
tempting in the second consent solicitation.
a.

If the aggregatefee is prorated in a partialoffer

The value of strategy (a) is given by the following sum:
7
5

[P(n<__12)]a +

f

+ 65 + Si f1

[P(n = 12 +
0

6

= 1.4165 a + .5835 g + .6153 y(a - g)

The value of strategy (b) is given by the following sum:
[P(n<14)]a + [P(n >.14 )]g
+ [1 -O]([P(n

10)]a+ [P(n> 10)](g+.O5f))

= 1.6444 a + .3556 g + .3238 'y(a - g)

Setting the two equal to each other yields y=.78.
b.

If the consent fee is not prorated (an any and all offer)

The value of strategy (a) similarly equals the following:
1.4165 a + .5835 g + .5835 'y(a - g)

and the value of strategy (b) is as follows:
1.6444 a + .3556 g + .3238 y(a - g)

Setting the two equal to each other yields =.8 8.
2. A Bondholder's Vote Becomes Public Only if the Amendment
Is Approved
Bondholder 1 may select one of two strategies:
(a) always consenting (i.e., cheating) or
(b) not cheating in the first consent solicitation and consenting
in subsequent solicitations only if the first consent solicitation was
rejected.
The consent fee is prorated among consenting bondholders.
The value of strategy (a) is given by the following sum:
.9165 a + .0835 g + .005766f
+

[

_ ][.9165 a + .0835 (g + .OS f)]

=1.8330 a + .1670 g + .1988 y(a - g)

The value of strategy (b) is given by the following sum:

1994]

CONSENT SOLICITATIONS
.9682 a + .0318 g+[
=

1

][.9682 a + .0318 (g + .O5

1.9364 a + .0636 g + .0318 y(a - g)

Setting the two equal to each other yields 7=.62.
C.

BONDHOLDERS' VoTEs ALWAYS BECOME PUBLIC,

WiTH Dw-ERENT CONSTANTS
Under the same assumptions as under the model in B.1.b., above,
except that the probability that any bondholder will select strategy (a),
cheating, is .6, and the probability that there is a second consent solicitation is .67, the value of strategy (a) is as follows:
.6919 a + .3081 (g + y(a - g))
+[1 0

][.1861 a + .8139 (g + y(a -g))]

=1.0697 a + 1.9606 g + 1.9606 (a - g)
The value of strategy (b) is as follows:
.8371 a + .1629 g + 2.0303 (.3325 a + .6675 (g + y(a - g)))
= 1.5122 a + 1.5181 g + 1.3552 y(a - g)

Setting the two values equal to each other yields =.73.

